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Sole Evidence and Legal Judgement of Lay People: Overestimated Posterior Probability and Threshold for Conviction

Abstract

In the present study, subjective likelihood of defendant’s guilt was compared to the posterior probability of guilt predicted by the Bayes’ theorem to examine whether lay people overestimate the posterior probability of guilt and to explore the types of probability in the Bayes’ theorem that may contribute to the overestimation. The difference of conviction threshold among experimental conditions(type of evidence and recognition of logical circularity) were also tested. Finally, individual’s implicit threshold for the decision to convict was calculated based on a logistic regression model in each experimental condition and its effect on the decision to convict was examined. In the result, participants overestimated the posterior probability of defendant’s guilt regardless of the type of sole evidence; their implicit threshold varied over experimental conditions; and the participants who recognized the logical circularity made the verdict by comparing the threshold and the probative value of sole evidence. In discussion, the factors that may have impacts on lay people’s verdict in criminal trials with sole evidence and the necessity of change in policy were discussed.

keywords
유일한 증거, 베이지안 사후확률, 유무죄 판단, 역치, 순환논증, sole evidence, Bayesian posterior probability, verdict, threshold, circular logic

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